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Abstract: This paper considers two different ways of formulating a desire-satisfaction theory of 
prudential value. The first version of the theory (the object view) assigns basic prudential value to 
the state of affairs that is the object of the person’s desire. The second version (the combo view) 
assigns basic prudential value to the compound state of affairs in which a) the person desires some  
state of affairs and b) this state of affairs obtains. My aims in this paper are twofold. First, to 
highlight that these are not mere notational variants, but in fact have quite different implications, 
so that this distinction is not one that the theorist of prudential value should ignore. More 
positively, I argue that the object view is better able to capture what is distinctive and appealing 
about subjective theories of prudential value, on any plausible account of what the central 
subjectivist insight is. 
On Two Interpretations of the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Prudential Value 
Joseph Van Weelden 
1. Introduction 
This paper considers two different ways of formulating a desire-satisfaction theory of prudential 
value.1 The first version of the theory assigns basic prudential value to the state of affairs that is 
the object of the person’s desire. The second version assigns basic prudential value to the more 
                                                      
1 The prudential value of a life (or of some part of a life) is a measure of how well it is going for the 
person living it. I will sometimes use the more familiar term ‘well-being’ to express the same evaluative 
notion. The question at issue in this paper is which states of affairs have basic or non-derivative 
prudential value. I call these the basic constituents of prudential value. 
complex state of affairs in which a) the person desires some state of affairs and b) this state of 
affairs obtains.2  
Insofar as, on both views, a person’s level of well-being supervenes on the extent to which 
their desires are satisfied, these are both desire-satisfaction accounts. The views need not disagree 
at all in their evaluations of how well off any given person is. Nonetheless, I argue that these 
formulations in fact amount to two distinct theories of prudential value, with different implications. 
One important moral of this paper is thus that, even where two theories of prudential value issue 
the same verdicts about how well off any given person is, these theories can nonetheless diverge 
significantly, both in which states of affairs they count as basically good for a person, and in their 
explanation of why these states of affairs are prudentially valuable. 
I will call the first formulation, according to which it is x, the state of affairs that is the 
object of person y’s desire, that is basically good for y, the object view. The second formulation, 
according to which it is the combination of person y’s desire for x and x itself that is basically 
good for y, I call the combo view.3 I am not the first to point out that these formulations differ in 
                                                      
2 To say that person y’s desire for some state of affairs x is satisfied is just to say that y desires that x 
obtains and x does, in fact, obtain. Where the object of y’s desire does not obtain, I will say that the desire 
is frustrated. I am here assuming, for simplicity, an unrestricted actualist version of desire-
satisfactionism. On this approach, the satisfaction of any of a person’s actual desires is relevant to that 
person’s well-being. The approach is actualist in that it is the desires a person has in the actual world that 
count, and unrestricted in that it imposes no constraints on which of these are prudentially relevant. The 
question of which of a person’s desires ought to be accorded prudential relevance is of course of crucial 
importance, but we can afford to bracket it, as here the same issues arise for the object as for the combo 
view. 
3 I am adopting this terminology from Ben Bradley’s extremely helpful discussion of the two views (see 
Bradley 2009 and 2014). My discussion throughout this paper is much indebted to Bradley’s. Rabinowicz 
and Osterberg (1994) instead call these views the object and satisfaction interpretations. I prefer 
Bradley’s terminology because it is less likely to encourage confusion between the satisfaction 
interpretation and the desire-satisfaction theory itself. 
some important respects.4 Nonetheless, one still finds many theorists of prudential value glossing 
over this distinction, and those who do not tend to underestimate its importance.  
My aims in this paper are twofold. First, to highlight that the object and combo view are 
not mere notational variants, but in fact have different axiological implications. When considering 
the appeal (or lack thereof), of a desire-satisfaction approach, we should not elide these differences. 
More positively, I argue that, on either of two plausible characterizations of what I call the 
subjectivist insight, the object view comes out as preferable to the combo view. At least, this is so 
if we grant (as I believe we should) that an important desideratum, when assessing the merits of 
any given formulation of the desire-satisfaction theory, is that it be a recognizably subjective 
approach. By means of this inquiry, we will thus be zeroing in, not only on the best version of 
desire-satisfactionism, but on what is distinctive and appealing about subjective accounts of 
prudential value more broadly. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. I begin, in section 2, by offering a more detailed 
characterization of the object and combo views. In section 3, I ask what makes a theory of 
prudential value subjective, and consider two distinct answers to this question, both of which seem 
to have considerable plausibility. In section 4 I show that, on either of these conceptions of the 
central subjectivist commitment, it is only the object view which lands the desire-satisfaction 
theory on the right side of the subjective-objective divide. In section 5 I consider what some others 
                                                      
4  The first published discussion of this interpretive issue that I am aware of (and still the most thorough) 
is found in Rabinowicz and Osterberg. Rabinowicz there argues for the object view, while Osterberg 
defends the combo view. Although the stated focus of their dialogue is preference utilitarianism, much of 
their discussion is also relevant to the issue of how best to understand the desire-satisfaction theory of 
prudential value. The two views are also discussed, under various names, by Dorsey (2012b, pp.272-5 and 
2013), Heathwood (2005, p.491), and Sarch (2011, pp.179-81). So far there has been no detailed, paper-
length evaluation of the comparative merits of these views precisely as approaches to prudential value. 
have said (and might yet say) in favour of the combo view, and find these arguments to be wanting. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. A Closer Look at the Combo and Object Views 
It is worth clarifying at the outset what the combo and object formulations are not disagreeing 
about. As understood here, both views take the bearers of basic prudential value to be states of 
affairs.5 Accordingly, the difference between them does not have to do with the ontological status 
of the entities that possess this sort of value. Rather, the question at issue is which states of affairs 
are basically prudentially valuable. It is fundamentally a dispute about what, for lack of a better 
term, we can call the location of the basic constituents of prudential value. 
We can better understand how these two views differ (as well as what commitments they 
have in common) through the lens of a distinction that has arisen in the literature on the explanatory 
role of desires with respect to reasons. Suppose, first, that one holds the view that every action is 
motivated by some desire. As discussed most thoroughly by Pettit and Smith, there are two very 
different ways in which an agent’s desire might figure into an explanation of why she did what she 
did.6 We might treat the desire as operating in the foreground of the agent’s deliberation. On this 
picture, the agent is reflectively aware of the fact that she has this desire and explicitly takes the 
fact that phi-ing would satisfy it into account in deliberating about whether to phi. On the 
alternative picture, desire operates only in the background. Here, the agent phis just because phi-
ing promises to bring about some state of affairs which she takes to be desirable. That is, according 
to Pettit and Smith, “[a]n agent…is sometimes prepared to act on his own ground-level desires 
                                                      
5 For our purposes, states of affairs are just those entities referred to by “that”-clauses. An example is the 
state of affairs that Francine is taking pleasure in a beautiful sunset. 
6 Pettit and Smith (1990). 
without bringing them explicitly into the foreground of deliberation.”7 They contrast this with the 
role that the desires of others typically play in one’s deliberations. “If somebody else desires that 
p, and he wishes to take this into account in his decision-making, then he must foreground the 
consideration of that desire. But if he himself desires that p…it will make perfect sense for him to 
act on that desire without explicitly focusing on it in his deliberation; all he may focus on is the 
fact that it is desirable in some way that p”.8 
A comparable distinction has been drawn in the literature on normative reasons, and 
exploited most extensively by Mark Schroeder.9 Schroeder draws our attention to two ways in 
which person y’s desires might explain what y has a normative reason to do. First, y’s desires may 
figure in the content of the reasons that y has. Alternatively, y’s desires may merely provide the 
background conditions that explain why certain considerations and not others are reasons for y. 
On the former view, which Schroeder rejects, “the fact that Ronnie desires to dance…[is] part of 
the reason for Ronnie to go to the party…the fact that there will be dancing at the party isn’t really 
a reason for Ronnie to go there, all by itself—but only in combination with the fact that Ronnie 
desires to dance.”.10 However, this view appears to give little weight to the role that the desire to 
dance actually plays in Ronnie’s psychic economy. For surely it is the opportunity to dance that 
really appeals to Ronnie, not the more complicated state of affairs that incorporates both his own 
desire and its satisfaction (unless, that is, he has a very unusual set of attitudes). If what we are 
after is a theory of normative reasons that takes the role of desire seriously, this lack of fit between 
                                                      
7 Ibid. (p. 583). 
8 Ibid. (pp.583-4). In Rabinowicz and Osterberg (1994, p.3) a similar contrast in drawn between what 
they call the ‘participant’ and the ‘spectator’ models, in the context of the object and combo views. I will 
return to this point in section 4. 
9 Schroeder (2007). 
10ibid p.23 
what the theory takes to be normatively significant for Ronnie and what is actually significant to 
Ronnie should give us pause, Schroeder thinks. On the alternative view that Schroeder goes on to 
defend, the fact that there will be dancing at the party is itself the reason for Ronnie to go there. 
Ronnie’s desire to dance is necessary to explain why he has a reason to go to the party, but it does 
not constitute any part of his reason to do so. This seems, if nothing else, to match up better with 
Ronnie’s own psychology. 
I believe the object and combo views of prudential value can be fruitfully compared with 
these contrasting views about reasons. The parallel between Schroeder’s view and the object view 
strikes me as especially close. Both views place desire at their very core, insofar as it is the presence 
of a desire for state of affairs x that explains why x is a) something y has a normative reason to 
pursue, or b) a basic constituent of y’s well-being. Just as on Schroeder’s view Ronnie’s desires 
wholly determine what he has reason to do, on the object view his desires wholly determine what 
is good for him. Nonetheless, these accounts treat Ronnie’s desires as operating in the explanatory 
background.  
When we are enumerating those states of affairs that are reasons for Ronnie, we need make 
no mention of his desires. Indeed, it is conceivable, if not plausible (since we typically desire 
among other things to be in certain mental states) that when we enumerate all the reasons that 
Ronnie has, his own mental states will not appear anywhere on our list. This last observation is 
quite compatible with the fact that it is certain of Ronnie’s mental states (namely his desires) that 
explain why the considerations that are reasons for him are such. 
Likewise, on the object view, what is good for Ronnie is the desired state of affairs x, not 
the combination of x (which could in principle be anything) and his desire. It is the state of affairs 
in which he dances that is a basic constituent of prudential value, not the combination of his 
dancing and his desire to dance. This once more opens up the possibility that the basic constituents 
of Ronnie’s well-being may all be states of affairs that are neither wholly nor partly constituted by 
his own mental states. The items which appear in our enumeration of the basic constituents of 
Ronnie’s good could reside entirely outside of Ronnie’s own head, even as their value would 
remain conditional on their bearing the right relation to what is going on in his head.  
By contrast, the combo view takes the basic constituents of prudential value to be more 
complicated states of affairs, composed of both a mental element, namely Ronnie’s desire that 
some state of affairs (in the above case, his dancing at the party) obtains, and an extra-mental 
element, namely that state of affairs itself. So, on this view, all those things that are basically good 
for Ronnie are located at least partly within his own head. The combo view shares this feature 
with the view, against which Schroeder is arguing, that one’s desires are always a constitutive part 
of one’s normative reasons. 
Despite its clear parallels with the debate about how to understand desire-based theories of 
normative reasons, the question of whether to embrace the object or the combo view has not yet 
received such sustained philosophical attention. This is not because there is less at stake in this 
dispute, I believe. The question of whether every normative reason goes hand in hand with some 
desire is far from the only question that matters. Theories that share this commitment may differ 
in their other commitments in ways that significantly impact their overall appeal. The same is true 
of desire-based theories of prudential value. The object and combo views are equally committed 
to the claim that, for every basic constituent of prudential value, there is some corresponding desire 
on the part of the relevant welfare-subject. This does not yet tell us everything we can reasonably 
expect a theory of prudential value to tell us, however.  
It is useful to distinguish here between three distinct questions that a theory of prudential 
value may be tasked with answering. The first, which I will call the enumerative question, is ‘what 
are the basic constituents of prudential value?’ The second, explanatory question, is ‘what makes 
it the case that these things, and only these things, are basic constituents of prudential value?’11  
The third question, which is not always sufficiently distinguished from the enumerative question, 
is ‘how prudentially valuable is a given person’s life (or some part of their life)?’ 
The object and combo views give different answers to the enumerative question, for the 
reasons sketched above. Where the former identifies the basic constituents of prudential value with 
those states of affairs that are the object of Ronnie’s desires, the latter builds a desire of Ronnie’s 
into each state of affairs it takes to be basically good for him. Only the former view, accordingly, 
leaves it open that (depending on what he is like) not only some but all the basic constituents of 
Ronnie’s well-being may be extra-mental entities.12 This is the first striking difference between 
the views. 
The responses that the object and combo views offer to the explanatory question also diverge. 
On the object view, the very fact that Ronnie desires some state of affairs x (say, that he dances 
this evening) is sufficient to make it the case that x is basically good for him. On the combo view, 
it is the (compound) state of affairs in which Ronnie desires to dance this evening, and this desire 
is satisfied, that is basically good for him. Moreover, this last state of affairs is good for Ronnie 
regardless of whether he has any higher-order desire for precisely this state of affairs. In other 
                                                      
11 I borrow the enumerative/explanatory distinction from Crisp (2006), who employs it, somewhat 
differently than I do, as a tool for classifying theories of prudential value. It is put to similar use by 
Fletcher (2013) and Rice (2013). 
12 There are views according part of what it is for a mental state to be a pleasure is that it is desired. 
Heathwood (2007) defends such a theory. If one combines the object view with a desire theory of 
pleasure, one thereby ensures that some of the basic constituents of Ronnie’s well-being are at least partly 
constituted by mental states (assuming Ronnie’s life contains at least some pleasure). However, I do not 
see any plausible way of securing the result that they all are, on the object view. 
words, although Ronnie’s desire to dance still figures in at the enumerative level (albeit in a 
different way than on the object view) we need not include this, or any other, desire among the 
background conditions that explain why the satisfaction of this, or any other, desire is basically 
good for him.13 Any instance of desire-satisfaction is good for Ronnie, on the combo view. The 
combo theorist has no need to invoke some further fact to explain why this is so.  
Where the object and combo views may turn out to differ not at all is in their assessment of 
any given person’s level of well-being.14 15 At least in their unrestricted actualist forms, both views 
give the result that whenever one of Ronnie’s desires is satisfied this corresponds to an increase in 
his well-being. Moreover (absent other differences in our formulation of the theories), each 
instance of desire-satisfaction corresponds to an increase in well-being of precisely the same 
amount whichever view we adopt. This potentially goes some way towards explaining the lack of 
attention to this distinction in much of the literature. If our aim is to identify a theory of well-being 
that can render the right substantive verdicts about how well off people are, it may be that there is 
                                                      
13  It would be passing strange to claim that the source of the prudential value of such compounds is 
always some second-order desire that the first-order desire be satisfied. This would, after all, just be to 
endorse the object view at one remove. Moreover, I see no principled reason for thinking that only desires 
that have as their object instances of desire-satisfaction possess such value-conferring power. A vicious 
regress also threatens if one ventures down this path. If a higher-order desire that my lower-order desire is 
satisfied is required to explain the prudential value of ground-level desire-satisfaction, how then do we 
explain why it is good for this higher-order desire to be satisfied? It appears that we will need to keep 
adding new desiderative levels ad infinitum. This is a bizarre result. It also makes it hard to see how 
prudential value gets into the picture in the first place. 
14 Bradley (2014, p.235) also highlights the apparent extensional equivalence of the object and combo 
view.  
15 A reviewer points out that even if the object and combo view agree about how much prudential value is 
realized at any time, they may still differ about the prudential value of prospects that are unrealized. 
Perhaps, then, I should not be so quick to grant that the theories are extensionally equivalent. The first 
thing to note is that establishing the extensional equivalence of the views is not part of my aim in this 
paper. I concede this equivalence only for the purposes of arguing that even if the views are extensionally 
indistinguishable we have reason to prefer the object view. That said, if it turns out that the combo view is 
extensionally more plausible than the object view in cases involving unrealized prospects, this would 
provide a compelling counterweight to my own argument in favour of the object view (although it would 
not impact this argument itself). I consider this possibility in section 5 below, when I canvass potential 
reasons for preferring the combo view. However, I do not see any plausible route to such a conclusion. 
nothing to choose between the object and combo view. And no doubt this is one of the aims we 
should have as philosophers of prudential value. However, as I will argue below, it is not the only 
aim we should have.  
3. The Subjectivist Insight: Two Accounts 
We have now identified two areas of divergence between the object and combo versions of 
desire-satisfactionism, and one area of agreement. In assessing the comparative merits of these 
formulations, we can distinguish two broad kinds of considerations. We need to ask, with respect 
to each of the questions identified above, whether the object or the combo view affords more 
plausible results. However, depending on the outcome of that initial investigation, we may also 
need to ask about the relative importance of these questions. If (as seems possible) one 
interpretation intuitively does better with respect to the enumerative question, but the other does 
better with respect to the explanatory question, any decision about which view we should 
ultimately favour will require us to take a stand on what the primary task of the theorist of 
prudential value is. In the next section, I will argue that a) the object view offers a more appealing 
response to the explanatory question than the combo view does, and b) this provides desire-
satisfaction theorists of well-being with a compelling reason to prefer the view. Yet before I can 
vindicate either claim, I must turn, in the present section, to address certain taxonomical issues. 
This will provide further clarification about what is at stake in the dispute between defenders of 
the object and combo views. 
Taxonomical questions are important here for the following reason. Desire-satisfactionism is 
generally taken to be the paradigmatic instance of a subjective theory of prudential value. We are 
here attempting to identify the most philosophically attractive version of the desire-satisfaction 
theory. In pursuing this sort of investigation, a reasonable first step is to inquire into what is 
distinctive and appealing about subjective theories of well-being in general. Given the enduring 
popularity of such views (not to mention the recent popularity of hybrid theories of well-being, 
which strive to combine elements of subjective and objective theories), it is clear that many 
philosophers of prudential value have thought that there is some important subjectivist insight. It 
is not the task of this paper to assess whether there really is any compelling reason to go 
subjectivist. The point here is simply that a desire-satisfaction theory that did not capture this 
apparent insight would in an important sense not be doing its job. In considering whether one who 
is attracted to desire-satisfactionism should endorse the object or combo view, it is therefore 
critical that we isolate this proposed insight, and see whether one of these versions of the theory 
does a better job of expressing it. 
 If this is the strategy, a firmer grasp on how the distinction between subjectivism and 
objectivism is employed in carving up accounts of prudential value is in the first place called for. 
Unfortunately, there is no consensus about what the best way of drawing this distinction is. 
Moreover, it is doubtful whether any proposed way of delineating the core commitments of 
subjectivism and objectivism about well-being, respectively, will be genuinely neutral with respect 
to substantive theoretical issues. This is, again, because isolating the essential features of 
subjective and objective theories requires one to take a stand on the question of what is distinctively 
appealing about each kind of theory. That is, we need to have some idea of what subjective theories 
are supposed to do, before we can ascertain whether a given theory deserves to be called subjective. 
This seems to be equally true in the objective case.  
Let me begin here by stating the approach to this distinction that I myself favour. I do not 
pretend that this method of classifying theories is either uncontroversial or substantively neutral, 
nor do I argue for it in this paper. It will be sufficient if the reader agrees that it has some intuitive 
appeal. On the proposal I have in mind, the beating heart of subjectivism is expressed by the idea 
that at least some of a person’s pro-attitudes (the traditional candidates are desires, but others have 
been suggested) are value-conferring. This is to say that, in at least some cases, states of affairs 
that would otherwise lack prudential value are good for Ronnie precisely because Ronnie cares 
about them (sufficiently and in the right way).16 Any theory of prudential value that does not imply 
that Ronnie can make certain things basically good for him by caring about them in the right way 
should, according to this view, not be classified as a subjective account. On the other hand, any 
theory that does endorse this idea should be classified as (at least partially) subjective.17 
A more common and influential way of characterizing the subjectivist insight, and thus of 
dividing theories of prudential value into subjective and objective, is that offered by Wayne 
Sumner.18 Sumner holds that “a theory is subjective if it treats my having a favorable attitude 
toward something as a necessary condition of the thing being beneficial for me”.19 Call the claim 
that nothing can be basically good for a person if that person does not have some pro-attitude 
toward it subjective necessity. This condition can be taken as imposing a kind of resonance or anti-
alienation constraint.20 If dancing leaves Ronnie completely cold, if he not only does not care 
                                                      
16Cf. Sobel (2016, p.1): “Subjectivism maintains that things have value because we value them. Caring 
about stuff makes stuff matter.” This formulation, of course, leaves us with many unanswered questions 
(‘should subjectivists focus on desires or some other class of pro-attitudes?’, ‘if desires are the correct 
focus, which desires?’). This, however, is by design. It is important that we cast as broad a net as we can, 
since my argument is precisely that, even on the most ecumenical understanding of the subjectivist 
insight, the combo view doesn’t adequately capture it. 
17 I say ‘at least partially’ because it seems to me preferable that our taxonomy leave room for genuine 
hybrid theories (that is, theories that include both objectivist and subjectivist elements). This sets my 
proposal apart from Sumner’s, for example, which treats subjectivism and objectivism as exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive categories. In the present context, however, nothing much hangs on this difference. 
18 Sumner (1995 and 1996). 
19 Sumner (1995, p.768). Tiberius (2007, p.373) endorses more or less the same criterion: “Those 
defending subjective theories argue that a person’s having a positive attitude (or a positive attitude under 
certain conditions) toward x is necessary for x to count as part of that person’s well-being. Proponents of 
objective theories deny this claim.” 
20 As expressed, for instance, by Dorsey (2017), Railton (1986), and Rosati (1996). 
about it but (perhaps) could not be brought to care about by various forms of idealization, it is too 
cut off from him to form any part of his good. All that is required to make a theory come out as 
subjective, on this account, is that it endorse subjective necessity. Objective theories, in turn, are 
for Sumner all those that reject subjective necessity. 
These two accounts of the subjective/objective distinction clearly adopt very different 
strategies. The first locates the core commitment of subjectivism in a certain kind of sufficiency 
claim, namely that Ronnie’s pro-attitudes are at least sometimes sufficient to make some state of 
affairs basically good for him. The second traces subjectivism’s appeal to a certain kind of 
necessity claim, namely the constraint that if x is to be basically good for Ronnie it is necessary 
that Ronnie have some (actual or counterfactual) pro-attitude to x. And yet, as I will argue in the 
next section, these two, otherwise radically opposed, accounts of the core subjectivist commitment 
have the same striking result. No matter which of these approaches we take, the combo view comes 
out as an objective theory. Now, this may be taken to be a deficiency in these approaches. Perhaps 
there is another plausible way of carving up the landscape that will give a different result. However, 
I do not see what this could be, and no such approach has yet been proposed. I will call this the 
problem of creeping objectivism.21 I believe the moral we should draw from it is that those who 
understand desire-satisfactionism according to the combo view have lost sight of the fundamental 
subjectivist idea, on any plausible reconstruction of what this idea is.  
4. The Problem of Creeping Objectivism 
According to the first proposal above, the heart of subjectivism resides in the claim that a 
person can confer basic prudential value upon a given thing by caring about it (sufficiently and in 
                                                      
21 The terminology here is meant to evoke Dreier (2004). This problem for the combo view is also raised, 
although not under this name, in Bradley (2014, pp.234-6). As a reviewer helpfully points out, the same 
kind of concern has been raised about Humean theories of normative reasons (where these are understood 
in the way Schroeder is arguing against). On this issue see Korsgaard (1996) and Hampton (1998). 
the right way). It follows that if the desire-satisfaction theory is to preserve what is appealing about 
subjective theories, it needs to be developed in such a way as will express this fundamental idea. 
Now, it should be clear that, understood according to the object view, the desire-satisfaction 
account of prudential value expresses the subjectivist insight quite well indeed.  Suppose 
Evangeline desires to meet William Shatner. Then the object view implies that the state of affairs 
in which she meets him is basically good for her. This is so even though, considered on its own, 
such a meeting does not plausibly possess any value. The fact that Evangeline desires that this 
meeting occur is the sole source of its prudential goodness.  
By contrast, the combo view does not, as it turns out, have the implication that Evangeline 
confers prudential value on any state of affairs by desiring it. True, the combination of 
Evangeline’s desire to meet Shatner and the state of affairs in which she does meet him is a basic 
constituent of prudential value, and one partially constituted by Evangeline’s desire. The state of 
affairs in which she meets Shatner, however, is not itself basically good for Evangeline. We 
obviously cannot say that in desiring this meeting Evangeline confers basic prudential value upon 
it, since it lacks any such value. As for the compound consisting of Evangeline’s desire for the 
meeting and the meeting’s occurrence, we have already seen that this state of affairs would be 
good for Evangeline regardless of her attitude to it. We are thus forced to conclude that 
Evangeline’s desires cannot themselves make things prudentially valuable, even though those 
things that are basically good for her are in part built up from her desires. 
Of relevance here is the contrast, drawn by Pettit and Smith, between the way that desire 
operates in first and in third person deliberation. Rabinowicz and Osterberg similarly distinguish 
between the participant and the spectator models of preference utilitarianism. As they point out, 
the object view appears to map on well to the former model, the combo view to the latter. The 
former emphasizes “participation in…projects, the situation is to be viewed from within’.22 The 
latter, on the other hand, takes something like the perspective of an impartial spectator. 
When evaluating the object and combo views as approaches to prudential value, it seems 
to me that the participant model better expresses what we as theorists should care about. This is 
because only it captures what the person whose well-being we are interested in cares about. If we 
could imaginatively assume the position of a benevolent and impartial angel, it may well be that 
what we would see as valuable would be the compound state of affairs consisting of Evangeline’s 
desire and its satisfaction. But this quite clearly does not map on to what Evangeline herself cares 
about. So, if the basic subjectivist insight is that certain of a person’s pro-attitudes explain why 
certain things are basically good for her, and the desire-satisfaction theory is supposed to capture 
this insight, the combo view becomes distinctly unappealing. If we are to be subjectivists, what 
matters to the person should be what matters to us. Explicitly focusing on what is good for 
Evangeline, rather than on an impersonal ranking of worlds, appears to eliminate any temptation 
to favour the combo version of desire-satisfactionism.  
Thus, on the account that ties subjectivism to the idea of value-conferring, the object and 
combo readings of the desire-satisfaction theory come out on different sides of the 
objective/subjective divide. It is important to see that the problem of creeping objectivism looms 
for the defender of the combo view even if they have a very different understanding of the core 
subjectivist insight.  
Consider Sumner’s account, which as we saw above constitutes a kind of mirror-image of 
the value-conferring approach. On this view, recall, the essential commitment of subjectivism is 
expressed via the idea of subjective necessity. If Evangeline lacks (or would lack, after 
                                                      
22 Rabinowicz and Osterberg (1994, p.3). 
idealization) any pro-attitude towards a thing, the claim is that this thing cannot be good for 
Evangeline, on pain of divorcing her too radically from her own good. Suppose that one is moved 
to accept subjectivism about prudential value by considerations of this sort. If Evangeline desires 
to meet Shatner, this plausibly suffices to ensure that the prospect of meeting Shatner resonates 
with her. Thus, if the desire-satisfaction theory is understood according to the object interpretation, 
all the basic constituents of Evangeline’s well-being would seem to satisfy the criterion of 
subjective necessity. By contrast, it appears that Evangeline could, while yet desiring to meet 
Shatner, be quite indifferent as to whether the following conjunction holds: I desire to meet William 
Shatner, and I do meet him. That more complicated state of affairs is just not what Evangeline 
cares about, at least not if Evangeline is like most of us. It is of course possible that Evangeline 
has a generic standing second-order desire that her first-order desires (whatever these may be) are 
satisfied. But the combo view itself affords no guarantee that this is so. It is, moreover, very 
implausible that such a desire exists in all those cases where desire-satisfaction intuitively matters 
for well-being. Focusing again on the case at hand, whether there exists such a second-order desire 
is intuitively irrelevant to whether it is good for Evangeline to meet Shatner.23 Subjective necessity 
is accordingly not preserved by the combo view, since what comes out as basically good for 
Evangeline on this view is something towards which she herself may be totally cold.24 It is striking 
that this formulation comes out on the intuitively wrong side of the subjectivist/objectivist divide, 
whether we distinguish subjective theories via a sufficiency claim (as in the value-conferring 
approach), or via a necessity claim (as in the resonance approach). 
                                                      
23 The combo view could seemingly satisfy the anti-alienation constraint only by requiring that Francine 
have a higher-order desire that her desire for x is satisfied. Whereas the view discussed in fn. 13 would 
allow the presence of a higher-order desire to confer value upon instances of desire-satisfaction, this view 
would allow the absence of such a desire to revoke their value. It is implausible for similar reasons.   
24 Dorsey (2012a, pp.272-5) also highlights the fact that the combo view fails to preserve resonance, and 
argues that we should prefer the object view on these grounds. 
This surprising compatibility of the combo view with objectivism can be further illustrated 
if we reflect on some recent developments in the literature on objective list theories of well-being. 
It has been pointed out that hedonism about prudential value (in at least some versions) can be 
seen as an objective list account, albeit with only one item on the list. The reasoning behind this 
claim is that, while the basic constituents of Evangeline’s well-being are for the hedonist all mental 
states, the value of these states is not explained by any of Evangeline’s pro-attitudes. Some 
defenders of pluralist objective list accounts, meanwhile, have proposed that we reserve a space 
on the list of attitude-independent prudential goods for desire-satisfaction itself.25 Moreover, Guy 
Fletcher has argued that the most plausible version of the objective list theory will recognize only 
goods that constitutively involve pro-attitudes.26 
These developments point towards a growing recognition that the key differences between 
objectivist and subjectivist theories stem from their respective answers to the explanatory, rather 
than the enumerative, question. If pluralist objective list accounts can include desire-satisfaction 
as one of the items on their list, then a monist objective list account which includes only desire-
satisfaction should also be possible.27 The fact that on such a view all the basic constituents of 
prudential value constitutively involve desires does not suffice to distinguish it from an objective 
list view, given the availability of an account like Fletcher’s. So much like hedonism before it, 
desire-satisfactionism now threatens to be swallowed up in objectivism. Indeed, it is no longer 
clear what is not an objective list theory. Apart, that is, from the object view. 
                                                      
25 This is suggested, for instance, by Arneson (1999, p.124), Keller (2009, p.659), and Rice (2013, p.6). 
26 Fletcher (2013). 
27 An anonymous reviewer notes that at this point “it is very natural to wonder why there shouldn’t be 
more than one thing on the basic list of goods”. Desire-satisfactionism, on the combo view, thus comes 
out looking like one idiosyncratic and not especially plausible version of an objective list theory. Again, 
this mirrors some of Korsgaard and Hampton’s criticisms of Humeanism (as the same reviewer reminds 
me). 
On the object view, it is easy to see what separates desire-satisfactionism from any version 
of the objective list approach. It is precisely its answer to the explanatory question. The object 
view holds that it is Evangeline’s pro-attitudes that confer prudential value upon states of affairs. 
Objective theories take the basic constituents of Evangeline’s well-being to possess attitude-
independent value (whether or not these states of affairs are pro-attitude involving). We here have 
a clear difference between the object view of desire-satisfactionism and all objective accounts, and 
the problem of creeping objectivism ceases to gain any traction. 
On the other hand, I can think of no plausible taxonomical approach that would 
conclusively land the combo view in the subjectivist camp. We ought therefore to conclude that 
the combo view cannot adequately capture the heart of subjectivism, whatever this might be. 
Granted, it is true that if one took subjectivism and objectivism about prudential value to be 
exclusively concerned with the enumerative question, one might be tempted to see the combo view 
as subjective, and indeed as more subjective than the object view. Subjectivism minimally does 
seem to involve some commitment to the dependence of well-being upon the agent’s mental states. 
One easy way of securing such a dependence is to embrace a view according to which the basic 
constituents of well-being are themselves mental states. This may help explain hedonism’s 
perennial appeal. Short of endorsing hedonism, the combo view nonetheless ensures that each 
basic constituent of well-being is at least partly composed of some mental state. The object view, 
on the other hand, does not guarantee that any of the basic constituents of Evangeline’s well-being 
is made up either wholly or partly of one of her mental states. This may lead some to conclude that 
those who feel the pull of subjectivist intuitions would be better served by adopting the former 
view.  
However, this would be a mistake. The debate between objectivism and subjectivism is 
best seen as orthogonal to the enumerative issue about whether the basic constituents of prudential 
value are located within or without the mind. We can bring this point out more clearly by 
considering the following view (or combination of views). Suppose that, in response to the 
explanatory question, one endorses a locative account of goodness for a person.28 According to 
the locative account, goodness for P is best understood as goodness simpliciter instantiated in P’s 
life. On this approach, nothing that is not good simpliciter can be a basic constituent of well-being. 
Moreover, all that is needed to explain why something is good for a person is the fact that it 
possesses this other sort of goodness, together with certain other conditions designed to ensure its 
connection to the person’s own life.  
Suppose, further, that our locative theorist thinks that the only things that are good 
simpliciter are mental states of some sort. We can be confident that this is a possible position 
because it has in fact been defended. G.E Moore famously held that the only way to make sense 
of goodness for a person is in terms of goodness simpliciter instantiated in that person’s life.29 
Nonetheless, prominent among the items that are good simpliciter he included pleasure, provided 
it is of the right sort. Specifically, Moore claimed that “by far the most valuable things which we 
know or can imagine are certain states of consciousness which may be roughly described as the 
pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects”.30 Moore did not himself 
defend the position that these are the only things that are good simpliciter. However, Donald 
Regan’s recent development of the Moorean approach explicitly denies that anything is basically 
                                                      
28 See Fletcher (2012). 
29 Moore (1903, p.99). One can also read Moore as a thoroughgoing skeptic about prudential value. It 
does not matter here which reading is historically correct. 
30 Ibid. (p.179). 
good besides certain mental states of this sort.31 This revised Moorean theory of prudential value 
combines a) a locative explanatory account, with b) a type of mental-state view at the enumerative 
level. Yet presumably a theory like Regan’s should not be classified as a version of subjectivism 
about prudential value at all. Certainly, it should not be classified as a more thoroughly subjective 
theory than the object interpretation of desire-satisfactionism. This again suggests that it is a 
theory’s answer to the explanatory question that really matters in assessing whether it captures 
what is essential to subjective accounts of prudential value. 
I hope to have brought out by now that a good deal hangs on the decision between these 
two formulations of the desire-satisfaction theory. This is so even if the object and combo views 
do not diverge at all in their substantive judgments about how well off people are. When it comes 
to assessing a person’s well-being level, nothing much may hang on the choice between the object 
and combo views. Hence, perhaps, the temptation to treat them as mere notational variants. 
However, we should not suppose that if two theories of prudential value agree about people’s 
respective well-being levels they agree on everything that matters. We have seen that the object 
and combo views differ in their responses to both the enumerative and the explanatory question. 
It is the latter question, we have argued, that is of primary importance when assessing the merits 
of these two formulae. 
A large part of the task of any theory of prudential value is to provide a plausible explanation 
of why the things that are prudentially valuable are so, and of why certain people are better off 
than others. Here is a silly example that nonetheless serves to sharpen the point. Imagine a view 
according to which some state of affairs x is basically good for any person y if and only if x is 
something that William Shatner wants for y. Suppose also that all the benevolent Shatner wants 
                                                      
31 Regan (2004). 
for any of us is for us to have exactly what we ourselves desire. We now have an approach that, in 
its extension, need not differ at all from either interpretation of the desire-satisfaction theory. But 
where desire-satisfactionism seems (at least when understood correctly) to be quite plausible, 
Shatner-satisfactionism is patently absurd.  
Of course, the combo view is much more intuitively appealing than Shatner-
satisfactionism. Indeed, of those who commit to one or the other interpretation, it is noteworthy 
that one finds support for the combo view among defenders of the desire-satisfaction theory as 
well as among its opponents.32 Nonetheless, we should conclude that to the extent there is a 
subjectivist insight, it is better represented by the object view, whether this insight is understood 
as essentially tied to value-conferring, or in terms of subjective necessity. 
One alternative moral that might be drawn from it is that the subjectivism and objectivism 
are simply not useful categories for thinking about theories of prudential value. However, if 
embracing the combo view requires us to jettison these categories, we should recognize how 
revisionist such an implication is. It is not merely that we would be forced to re-classify certain 
approaches. The very idea that there are any theories of prudential value that are not objective list 
theories would have broken down. We would need to find a radically new way of conceiving what 
is at stake in philosophical discussions of well-being, then. This implication has not, I think, been 
adequately appreciated. 
5.The Combo View Strikes Back? 
                                                      
32 Desire-satisfactionists who favour the combo view include Heathwood (2005, p.491), Lukas (2010, pp. 
3-4), and Osterberg. Opponents of the theory who also favour this interpretation include Bradley (2009, 
pp.25-30) and Sarch (2011, pp.179-81).  
Despite the above considerations, which amount to a forceful case against it, the combo 
view of desire-satisfactionism retains notable adherents. What might account for this view’s 
appeal?  
One possible explanation is that its advocates are committed (either explicitly or implicitly) 
to the idea that basic prudential value supervenes on intrinsic properties. The object view, unlike 
the combo view, would require us to give up on any such commitment. As Alexander Sarch 
highlights, the object view implies that the basic prudential value of the desired state of affairs 
supervenes on something other than its intrinsic features (namely the relation between this object 
and my mental state).33  
I do not think the partisan of the object view need be swayed by this implication, however. 
The objection assumes that basic prudential value is a) a kind of intrinsic value, where this is 
contrasted with the broader category of final or non-instrumental value, and b) that the intrinsic 
value of an object or state of affairs supervenes on its intrinsic properties. Neither of these are 
uncontroversial positions in axiology. I have been careful to speak in terms of basic or non-
derivative prudential value throughout. This leaves openthe issue of whether the value involved is 
best understood as intrinsic value, as opposed to another species of final value, and it certainly 
leaves open whether the value of any basic constituent of prudential value must supervene on its 
intrinsic properties.  Moreover, when the value we are dealing with is specifically prudential value, 
these assumptions strike me as especially questionable. Part of what is distinctive about prudential 
value is that it is a fundamentally relational kind of value. The ability to readily account for this 
relationality is no doubt part of what makes subjectivist approaches so appealing to many. But 
even the staunchest objectivist must hold that some state of affairs x being valuable for me (as 
                                                      
33 Sarch (2011, p.180). See also Osterberg (p.17) and Lukas (p.9) 
opposed to simpliciter) implies some relation between x and myself. Granting this point, it does 
not seem at all surprising that the relational features of a thing (specifically, the attitudes I have 
toward this thing) can make a difference to whether it is basically valuable for me.34  
Another possible explanation (although not one that any advocate of the combo view, to 
my knowledge, has explicitly invoked) has to do with what the object view implies about the 
prudential value of merely prospective states of affairs. Contrary to what I granted above, it may 
be that, even if the object and combo view agree about how much prudential value is in fact realized 
at any time, they will disagree about how prudentially valuable certain states of affairs will be 
when they are realized.35  
Suppose, for instance, that Elon presently desires that Mars be colonized by humans.36 On 
the most natural reading of the object view, this implies that the state of affairs in which Mars is 
colonized is good for Elon. But now imagine that Elon has ceased to have any such desire by the 
time at which Mars is successfully colonized (this may be due to a routine change in his desires 
or, more dramatically, to his own death). The object view seems to imply that the colonization of 
Mars is nonetheless good for Elon (assuming, that is, that his desire for this state of affairs did not 
include an explicit or implicit time-index).37 This may be difficult to accept. 
The combo view might seem to escape the above implication. This will depend on how it 
is formulated. Recall, the combo view holds that it is the combination of y’s desire for x and x 
itself that is basically good for y. In the above case, it is not the colonization of Mars itself that we 
attribute prudential value to, but the compound state of affairs in which Elon desires that Mars is 
                                                      
34 See Dorsey (2012a) for further elaboration and defense of this point. 
35 Again, I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point. 
36 The example is borrowed from Bradley 2016 (pp.4-5) 
37 A further question that arises on this sort of view is ‘when is it good for Elon’? There have been several 
proposed answers to this question (see Bradley 2016 and Dorsey 2013). I can remain agnostic. What is 
important to note here is that the choice between the object and combo view does not settle this issue. 
colonized and Mars is colonized. There are at least two ways we might read this conjunction, 
however. It might be taken to incorporate an implicit time-stamp, such that what really bears 
prudential value is the combination of Elon desiring colonization at time t and colonization 
occurring at time t. On this reading, the combo view avoids the potentially worrying result. 
However, there is nothing in the combo view as initially stated that requires such a reading.  Some 
defenders of the combo view do accept such a concurrence requirement.38 However, others do 
not.39  
Even if a concurrence requirement is not built into the combo view, it is evidently 
consistent with it. If it turns out that such a requirement is not compatible with the object view, 
this would provide reason for those who favour concurrence to prefer the combo view. Yet I see 
no reason to suppose this. The object view can be quite easily modified so as to incorporate such 
a condition. Even though it is the state of affairs itself that is the basic unit of prudential value, it 
is the presence of a desire for this state of affairs that makes it valuable. If it turns out that there is 
no such desire at the time at which the state of affairs obtains, we may well be inclined to say that 
there is also no value. This is quite compatible, I think, with the spirit of the object view.40  
These are only two possible explanations for the popularity of the combo view. I have 
suggested that they do not hold up well under scrutiny. There may be other explanations, but these 
are not readily apparent. We have already seen that there are weighty reasons to favour the object 
view. So, absent further arguments in favour of its opponent, we ought to conclude that the object 
view is on balance preferable. 
                                                      
38 See Heathwood (p.490). 
39 See Lukas (pp. 18-21). 
40 It seems to me that a similar story should be told about cases those where person y presently lacks a 
desire for state of affairs x but will come to acquire such a desire. What the object and combo views, 
respectively, imply about such cases will depend on whether a concurrence requirement is built in. This 
decision is independent of which of the two formulations we adopt. 
6.Conclusion 
If nothing else, the preceding discussion indicates that the distinction between the object 
and combo views is something that more theorists of prudential value should be thinking about. 
These two formulations of the desire-satisfaction theory diverge significantly in both their 
enumerative and explanatory commitments, and we do well to keep this in mind. I hope, moreover, 
to have shown that the object view is better able to capture what is distinctive and appealing about 
subjective theories of prudential value, on any plausible account of what the central subjectivist 
insight is. This does not conclusively settle the matter, as there may yet be some powerful 
countervailing argument we have failed to consider. I do not know what this would be. As things 











                                                      
41 I wish to thank David Enoch, Iwao Hirose, Andrew Reisner and Sarah Stroud for extremely helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this article. I am also grateful to audiences at McGill University’s 
Philosophy Workshop Series and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s Centre for Moral and Political 
Philosophy for valuable feedback. Finally, I am indebted to two anonymous referees for this journal, 
whose detailed and perceptive comments resulted in significant improvements to the article.  
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